Staveley Railway
- Details
- Category: Sample Data-Articles
- Published on 22 August 2011
- Hits: 347
The Staveley Works station was opened on 4 June 1892 (following an inspectors delay) by the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, and closed on 4 March 1963...
(The history and archive images of the station are currently being compiled by the Staveley History Society)
In the interim, excerpt(s) from the Accident Report from 1899, for your entertainment:
Board of Trade (Railway Department),
8, Richmond Terrac, Whitehall, london, S.W.,
November 10th, 1899
Sirs,
I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with the Order of the 13th October, the result of my enquiry into the collision which occurred at Staveley Station, on the Midland Railway, on the 7th October, 1899.
In this case, the 5.25 a.m. workmen's train from Chesterfield to Markham was, by a mistake on the part of the signalman on duty, admitted, during foggy weather, into Staveley Station, at a low rate of speed, whilst the 5.8 a.m. workmen's train from Dronfield to Glapwell was still standing at the platform. The result was a collision, in which eight carriages in the leading train and the engine of the rear train sustained slight damages. No passengers were seriously injured, but 36 complaints of slight injuries have been received from workmen who were travelling in the train.
The Chesterfield to Markham train consisted of a six-wheels-coupled tender engine, fitted with steam brake on engine and tender wheels, and eight workmen's carriages and two workmen's carriage brakes, all fitted with the automatic vacuum brake, both brakes being worked by one lever from the footplate.
The Dronfield to Glapwell train consisted of one six-wheels-coupled tender engine, fitted with the steam brake on engine and tender wheels, and eleven workmen's carriages and two workmen's carriage brakes, all fitted with the automatic vacuum brake, both brakes being worked by one lever from the footplate. The damage to rolling stock is given in the appendix.
Description.
Staveley is a station on the Midland main line between Chesterfield and Masborough, and is the junction for the single branch line to Mansfield, on which the Markham and Glapwell stations are both situated.
The main down and up lines run through the station in directions which are approximately north and south, and they are provided with separate platforms connected by a footbridge. At the back or east side of the up platform is a back platform, used for the service trains on the branch line to Mansfield.
There is a signal-box, known as the Staveley Junction box, on the down side of the main line, about 20 yards from the south end of the down platform. From this box all the points and signals connected with the station are worked.
The branch line to Mansfield has a double connection with the main lines close to this signal-box, and it then runs northward nearly parallel to the main lines for about 200 yards before diverging to the right. This branch line is worked on the tablet system.
The home signals for the down main and for down trains on the branch line are about 200 yards to the south of the signal-box. The starting signal for the branch line is at the north end of the branch platform, about 200 yards from the box.
In clear weather there is nothing to prevent the signalman in the box seeing a train standing at the branch platform.
Evidence.
A copy of the evidence statements given can be accessed at: www.railwayarchives.co.uk
Conclusions.
There is no doubt as to the facts of this case, and the cause of the accident is clear...
The signalman states that he felt confident that the first train had started before he admitted the second train to the station, but he allows that just before doing so he looked out of his window and listened, which clearly shows that there were doubts in his mind on the subject.
There was a fog signalman on duty in the box to assist him, so, if he felt the slightest doubt on the matter, it was clearly his duty to have sent this man to ascertain for him for certain whether the line was clear. His omission to do so was the main cause of the accident, the responsibility for which must rest chiefly on his shoulders...
A copy of the full consclusion and damage appendix can be accessed at: www.railwayarchives.co.uk
